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 High-stakes testing can induce undesirable forms of test preparation and score 
inflation. This study uses changes in relative performance when a test is replaced to 
investigate the distribution of score inflation. Using new high-stakes and norm-referenced 
tests first administered in Kentucky in 2012, we investigated the relationship between 
changes in relative performance and student and school characteristics. The performance 
of poor students declined relative to others in their schools, and the mean scores of 
schools with high concentrations of poor students declined more than those of schools 
with lower concentrations, above and beyond the effects of student-level poverty. 
Students with disabilities declined in performance, while Asian students improved. These 
findings are all consistent with the hypothesis that score inflation tends to be more severe 
among groups with low average performance.
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 High-stakes testing in various forms has been a cornerstone of U.S. education 
policy for decades. Numerous studies have shown that as a result, scores can become 
inflated—that is, scores can increase more than improvements in achievement warrant—
and that this bias can be very large (e.g., Jacob, 2007; Koretz & Barron, 1998). A smaller 
number of studies have found that on average, both test preparation and score inflation 
affects disadvantaged students more than others (e.g., Herman & Golan, 1993; Klein et 
al., 2000). 
 However, the literature investigating the distribution of score inflation remains 
limited. Much of it is highly aggregated, e.g., comparing inflation for subgroups at the 
level of states (e.g., Klein et al., 2000). Although it is reasonable to expect the processes 
that create score inflation to vary differently within- and between schools (Koretz & 
Hamilton, 2006), few studies have applied a multi-level framework to the evaluation of 
inflation. 
 Using statewide data from Kentucky, this study uses a novel approach to explore 
the distribution of score inflation: we examine the distribution of changes in performance 
when long-standing high-stakes test was replaced by a new high-stakes test aligned with 
the Common Core state standards. We expect substantial variation in these difference 
scores because of both measurement error and differences in test content. However, 
systematic variations in the difference scores may signal variations in inappropriate 
preparation for the old test. We investigate whether systematic variation in difference 
scores is consistent with the literature showing greater inappropriate test preparation and 
inflation among disadvantaged students. We fit two-level models to estimate the 
distribution of inflation both within and between schools. To guard against artifacts 
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stemming from the specifics of the new test, we replicate these analyses using as an 
outcome a second, low-stakes test first administered in the same year. 
Background 
 The problem of score inflation has been well documented over the past quarter 
century. Score inflation can arise even under low-stakes conditions because even then, 
teachers may focus on the specific content of the test rather than on the broader domain 
from which it samples and that it is intended to represent (Lindquist, 1951). However, the 
empirical literature evaluating inflation arose decades later in response to the increasing 
importance of high-stakes testing, which increases incentives to focus on the specific 
content of the test. Most often, potential inflation has been evaluated by comparing trends 
in scores on a high-stakes test to trends on another, lower-stakes “audit” test measuring a 
similar domain. The logic of these studies is that for inferences based on the high-stakes 
test to be valid, performance must generalize from that test to the largely latent domain, 
and if performance does generalize to the domain, it should show a reasonable degree of 
generalization to performance on other tests designed to support similar inferences. Most 
often, the audit test has been the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP; 
e.g., Klein et al., 2000; Jacob, 2007; Ho & Haertel, 2006; Koretz & Barron, 1998). NAEP 
has several advantages: it is widely accepted as a high-quality test, and there are few 
incentives to prepare students specifically for it. However, numerous other tests have 
been used as audit measures, including commercial norm-referenced tests (Koretz, Linn, 
Dunbar, & Shepard, 1991; Ng & Koretz, 2013) and college- admissions tests (Koretz & 
Barron, 1998). 
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 Although no studies to date directly link specific behaviors of individual 
educators to score inflation, a considerable body of research has documented responses to 
testing that could produce score inflation. Examples include narrowing of instruction, 
adapting instruction to mirror the format or style of test items, overemphasizing scoring 
rubrics used on the test, and teaching test-taking tricks (e.g., Koretz, Barron, Mitchell, 
and Stecher, 1996; Pedulla, et al., 2003; Stecher & Mitchell, 1995). In addition, some 
studies have documented behaviors that would not bias individuals’ scores but can bias 
aggregate scores. One is disproportionately focusing resources on students thought to be 
near the “proficient” cut score—so-called “bubble students”—because in current 
standards-based accountability systems, it is the binary classification of students as 
proficient or not that has the most severe consequences (Booher-Jennings, 2005; Gillborn 
& Youdell, 2000; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010; Stecher et al., 2008). While this may 
produce valid gains for these students, it creates a biased view of aggregate improvement. 
 Numerous studies have found that undesirable forms of test preparation are more 
severe among disadvantaged students and in schools serving a high percentage of 
disadvantaged students. These schools often have a stronger emphasis on assigning drills 
of test-style items and teaching test taking strategies (Cimbricz, 2002; Diamond & 
Spillane, 2004; Eisner, 2001; Firestone, Camilli, Yurecko, Monfils, & Mayrowetz, 2000; 
Herman & Golan, 1993; Jacob, Stone, & Roderick, 2004; Jones, Jones, & Hargrove, 
2003; Ladd & Zelli, 2002; Lipman, 2002; Luna & Turner, 2001; McNeil, 2000; McNeil 
& Valenzuela, 2001; Taylor et al., 2002; Urdan & Paris, 1994). Evidence about the 
distribution of score inflation is more limited but consistent with this. Several reports 
show that the gains made by low-income and minority students relative to white students 
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on state tests are not matched on audit tests (Klein et al., 2000; Jacob, 2007; Ho & 
Haertel, 2006).  
 In a study that compared performance on several different tests in Texas, Klein et 
al. (2000) noticed an anomalous pattern in the between-school relationships between 
high-stakes test scores and other variables. In the case of other tests, relationships 
between scores on different tests and between scores and SES were stronger at the school 
level than at the student level, which is the anticipated effect of aggregation. In the case 
of high-stakes test scores, however, the reverse was true: in almost every case, the 
relationship between high-stakes scores and other variables was weaker at the school 
level than at the student level. These findings, unlike the main findings of their study, 
were based on a sample of only 20 schools in a single district, so the authors were 
hesitant to draw conclusions from it. However, Koretz & Hamilton (2006) noted that 
these findings are consistent with greater test preparation and score inflation in low-
scoring schools. Therefore, they recommended examining differences between within- 
and between-school relationships as a part of investigating potential score inflation. To 
our knowledge, however, few studies have explored this. 
 The limited number of findings to date suggesting greater test preparation and 
score inflation among disadvantaged students is not surprising given the specifics of 
schooling and accountability in the U.S. Both No Child Left Behind and many of the 
state accountability programs that preceded it require larger gains—often, much larger 
gains—by low-scoring groups of students. In addition, many low-scoring schools face 
additional difficulties in raising scores, such as high transience and relatively 
inexperienced staff. 
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 We therefore undertook the present study with the following hypotheses: 
• Within schools, low-scoring groups of students will on average have more 
inflated scores on the old high-stakes test and will therefore decline in relative 
performance on the two new tests. 
• Similarly, schools with high concentrations of students from low-scoring groups 
will decline in relative performance, above and beyond the decline predicted by 
the within-school student-level relationships. 
 In keeping with the earlier studies noted above, we hypothesized that both poor 
students and students in high-poverty schools would decline in relative performance with 
the introduction of the new test. Because of Kentucky’s demographics, we did not have a 
strong hypothesis about the relationships between race/ethnicity and changes in 
performance. Kentucky’s Hispanic student population is small, and its African-American 
population is small and highly concentrated: 50% percent are in Jefferson County 
(Louisville), and another 13% are in Fayette County (Lexington). This leaves the race 
effect, if there is one, substantially conflated with district effects. Nonetheless, we 
included dummy variables for race/ethnicity. Although we are not aware of research 
evaluating differential test preparation or score inflation affecting students with 
disabilities, we expect that they will be affected more, for the for the same reasons that 
other low-scoring groups have been. Some students with disabilities are exempted from 
the general-education testing program and hence would not create similar incentives for 
teachers, but those students do not appear in our data. 
 In addition, in the general case, one might expect that schools that had shown 
particularly rapid cohort-to-cohort gains on the previous high-stakes test would show 
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declines in relative performance. However, it is not clear whether one should expect this 
in the present context. The earlier testing program was in place for 12 years before the 
change to the new program used as an outcome in this study. While one might expect to 
find relationships between cohort-to-cohort gains and inflation in the early years of 
testing programs, test preparation activities might have been so well diffused through the 
state at the time of our data that variations in gains on the earlier test might no longer 
have predictive power. Nonetheless, we evaluated this possibility. 
 This study evaluates these hypotheses by examining changes in performance 
when one high-stakes test is replaced by another. This approach, not previously used in 
this literature, shares two assumptions with the more conventional approach. We assume 
that the audit test used for comparison—in this case, the new test—has not (yet) been the 
focus of intensive test preparation, and that it is sufficiently similar to the old test in terms 
of the intended inference to serve as an audit.  
 This approach faces two threats. The first is that teachers will have already 
engaged in substantial preparation focused on the new test. If preparation for the new test 
is extensive enough and is distributed similarly to preparation for the old test, the result 
will be a Type II error, either failing to identify inflation or underestimating it. This 
possibility therefore does not threaten positive findings from our analysis. 
 The second threat is more serious: the possibility that the new and old tests are 
designed to sample differently enough from the domain to make the adequacy of the new 
test as an audit measure questionable. This may be a particularly important threat 
currently because of the introduction of tests aligned with the Common Core State 
Standards, including the primary test used as an outcome in this study. If the new and old 
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tests are sufficiently different in their sampling, differences in alignment between 
curriculum and the two tests could create systematic variations in the difference scores 
we examine even in the absence of any behavioral responses to testing—and hence 
without any score inflation. Moreover, it is possible that such differences in alignment are 
consistent with our hypotheses. For example, suppose that the new test includes content 
not included in the old test and that this new content was emphasized more in advantaged 
schools than in disadvantaged schools before the introduction of the new test. This is 
plausible when the new content is more advanced. This would create systematic 
variations in the difference scores similar to that produced by greater inflation in 
disadvantaged schools. 
 We took advantage of a unique aspect of Kentucky’s testing program to address 
this limitation. In the spring of 2012, the Kentucky Department of Education first 
administered two new tests. One, the Kentucky Performance Rating for Educational 
Progress (KPREP) test, is the state’s new high-stakes test, aligned with the Common Core 
Standards. This replaced the Kentucky Core Content Test (KCCT), the high-stakes test 
last administered in 2011. The second was a norm-referenced test, the Stanford 10 (SAT-
10). This allowed us to replicate our analyses of KPREP with identical analysis of the 
SAT-10. Similar findings with the SAT-10 would strengthen the inference that variations 
in the difference score reflect preparation for the KCCT rather than specific attributes of 
the KPREP. 
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Data 
 Our data consist of student-level test scores for students in grades 3-8 from spring 
2007 through spring 2012. These data include KPREP scores for 2012 and KCCT scores 
for all earlier years.  
 For this analysis, we limited our sample to students who were in grades 5-8 in 
2012 in schools classified as A1 by the Kentucky Department of Education. These are 
public schools other than preschools, special education schools, or other alternative 
programs. We also limited our analysis to schools with more than 10 students. Because 
we used difference scores as our outcome, we included only the 71% of students in these 
schools who had scores in the appropriate grades in both the 2012 and 2011. We removed 
26,244 students across all grades who were assigned the highest or lowest obtainable 
scale scores (HOSS/LOSS) on either test. Reasons for this exclusion are discussed in 
detail below. (A sensitivity test examining the impact of this exclusion is included in the 
Appendix.) Finally, we excluded students whose recorded scale scores were outside the 
range for the relevant grade, as these students were either out-of-grade or given incorrect 
scores. Our final count across grades 5-8 was 181,477 students, which was approximately 
63% of our original data. 
 The final analytic sample was very similar in terms of demographics to the 
original data. In both samples, approximately 82% of the students were white, 11% 
African-American, 4% Hispanic, and 1% Asian. As a result of dropping the students who 
scored HOSS or LOSS, there is a slightly higher percent (60%) of poor students in our 
analytic sample compared to 57% in the original data. 




 Our outcome variable is the difference between a student’s score on KPREP in 
2012 and his or her score on the KCCT in the prior grade in 2011.  
 These two tests were scaled differently, and the shapes of the distributions of 
scores were markedly different. It was therefore not reasonable to use a simple difference 
score, and simple standardization would have retained differences between the 
distributions other than means and standard deviations. We therefore needed to transform 
the scale scores, and the distribution of KCCT scores further necessitated a sensitivity 
analysis to address censoring. 
 The KCCT was scaled using a 3-parameter and generalized partial credit IRT 
model, which does not provide a one-to-one mapping of scale scores to raw scores. To 
obtain such a mapping, raw scores were mapped to the test characteristic curve (TCC; 
Kentucky Department of Education, 2009). Mapping scale scores to the TCC often 
stretches the tails of the distribution considerably more than some other scaling 
approaches (e.g., Thissen & Orlando, 2001). In addition, the estimation method used does 
not directly estimate scale scores for students with perfect scores, either 0 or 100 percent 
of possible credit. This was handled by setting the lowest and highest obtainable scale 
scores, HOSS and LOSS, a priori and assigning these to students with perfect scores 
(Kentucky Department of Education, 2009). 
 In contrast, the KPREP is scaled using a Rasch model (Kentucky Department of 
Education, n.d.), which provides scale scores that are mapped one-to-one with raw 
scores. Rasch scaling will often stretch the tails of the distribution less than mapping to 
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the TCC. Rasch scaling, like the estimation method used with the KCCT, does not 
directly estimate scale scores for students with perfect scores. In the case of KPREP, this 
was handled in two stages. First, a small adjustment (±0.25) was made to perfect scores 
to permit direct estimation of the underlying scale score. Second, LOSS and HOSS of 
100 and 300 were imposed on the reporting scale (Johnson, 2014). 
 The result of these decisions was very different distributions of scores on the two 
tests in the two years we analyzed. As expected, the KCCT distribution shows more 
stretching of the tails. This is shown in Figure 1, which displays adjacent grades (grade 5 
for the KCCT and grade 6 for the KPREP) because adjacent grades are used in the 
calculation of our outcome measure.  In addition, the KCCT distribution shows modest 
left-censoring and substantial right-censoring, which could reflect both the location of 
HOSS and LOSS and raw-score censoring. In the grade 5 KCCT, 13% of students were 
in the HOSS spike and 4% in the LOSS spike. In contrast, the KPREP distributions were 
free of censoring. As the figure suggests, with HOSS and LOSS included, the KCCT is 
more skewed (skewness = -.38) than is the KPREP (skewness = .29).  
 We took two steps to address these differences in scale. First, we normalized 
(probit-transformed) scores on both tests by calculating percentile ranks and mapping 
these to the cumulative normal distribution. Second, because we have no information on 
the appropriate distribution of performance for students assigned HOSS or LOSS, we 
excluded those students from our main analyses. Our outcome variable was then the 
simple difference in these probit-transformed scores. 
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Predictors 
 Our predictor variables were a number of student characteristics, school-level 
aggregates of these student-level variables, and historical data on school mean test scores. 
 We included three race/ethnicity dummy variables, for Black, Hispanic, and 
Asian. The reference group coded zero included Whites and other. A dummy variable for 
poverty was defined by whether the student participated in the free or reduced-price 
lunch program. The final dummy indicated whether a student had an individualized 
education program (IEP) plan under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 
Because most students with recognized disabilities have IEP plans, this is a reasonable 
proxy for the presence of a disability. 
 The school-level aggregate variables were the means of these variables, that is, 
the proportions of students with the dummy variables set to 1. However, these aggregate 
variables were calculated from all students enrolled in each school, without excluding the 
students noted above, because we expect educators’ responses to testing to be influenced 
by the characteristics of all the students present in the school.  
 In addition to these aggregates, to evaluate the possible relevance of earlier 
cohort-to-cohort gains, we included a school-level variable representing the difference 
between schools’ mean scores on the KCCT in 2010 from 2007. In order to remain 
consistent in our use of KCCT scores, we normalized this trend variable, but with respect 
to the distribution of school means rather than students’ scores. We then subtracted the 
2007 normalized school mean from the 2010 normalized mean. We also specified models 
using each individual year of change (e.g. 2007 to 2008), but we found that these yielded 
similar results but introduced more noise, so our final models use a single change 
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variable. This change does not include the change between 2010 and 2011 because 2011 
scores are used in the calculation of the outcome variable. 
 Finally, we included a dummy variable indicating whether the school was located 
in a county identified as Appalachian by the Appalachian Regional Commission because 
many of the communities identified as Appalachian are highly disadvantaged. 
Analytic strategy 
 We used a difference-score approach in which the outcome is the difference 
between a student’s normalized score on KPREP in the first year of administration (2012) 
and her normalized score on the KCCT the in the prior year and grade, that is: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 − 𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1)(𝑖−1),
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾  (1) 
where S is the normalized score and i, j, t, and g index student, school, year, and grade, 
respectively. Because the KPREP and KCCT scores are normalized and not linked, this 
difference score contains no information about absolute changes in performance with the 
introduction of the new test. Rather, measures the change in a students’ position in the 
distribution of scores with the introduction of the new test. We assume that scores on the 
new KPREP test are less affected by test preparation and therefore that on average, 
students whose scores on KCCT were more inflated should have negative values on the 
outcome, that is, they should on average fall in relative position. 
 We began with simple student-level ordinary least squares models for both the 
KPREP and the SAT-10. These models are of the form: 
 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝐗𝐢𝛃𝟏 + 𝑒𝑖, (2) 
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where i indexes students, Y is the difference score, and 𝐗𝐢 is a vector of student 
characteristics. These models confound within- and between-school relationships and 
ignore clustering of students within schools, but they provide a baseline description. 
 We then estimated two-level mixed models (students nested in schools) not only 
for accurate standard errors, but also because the structural relationships at the school 
level are substantively important. Because score inflation depends on the behavior of 
educators, we expect it to be a teacher- and school-level variable, and we expect 
substantial predictable variations in inflation between schools. Our core models were the 
following random-intercepts models: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝐗𝐢𝐢𝛃𝟏𝟏 + 𝑒𝑖𝑖  
 𝛽0𝑖 = 𝛾00 + 𝐗�𝟏𝟎𝜸𝟏𝟏 + 𝐙𝟏𝐢𝛄𝟏𝟎 + 𝛾03𝑊0𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (3) 
where 𝐗𝐢𝐢 is a vector of student characteristics, 𝐗�𝟏𝟎 is the school means of these student 
characteristics, 𝐙𝟏𝐢 is the vector of school mean change variables, and 𝑊0𝑖 is a dummy 
variable indicating whether a school is located in a county identified as Appalachian. 
Estimates of 𝛾03 were small and not significant, so we dropped the term 𝛾03𝑊0𝑖 from the 
models reported here. As noted, because we the use of all school change variables did not 
add useful information, we replaced 𝐙𝟏𝐢 with a single variable indicating school mean 
change over the three-year period in the models reported below. 
 We grand-mean-centered the student-level outcome and predictor variables in our 
models. We centered all test scores before calculating the gain scores. We centered all 
school-level predictors, including historical school mean test scores, on the means of 
school means.  
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 Grand-mean centering at the student level yields parameter estimates for level-2 
variables that are direct estimates of context effects (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). That is, 
the parameter estimates for level-2 aggregate variables indicate the extent to which they 
have an association with the outcome above and beyond the effects of the corresponding 
level-1 variables.  
SAT-10 Replication 
 Our replication using the SAT-10 differed from the model in equation (3) only in 
the construction of the outcome measure. Rather than subtracting KCCT scores from 
KPREP scores in the following year and grade, we subtracted them from SAT-10 scores 
in the following year and grade: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐾10 − 𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1)(𝑖−1).
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾  (4) 
Falsification Tests 
 The falsification tests differed from the primary analyses in equation (3) in that 
they were lagged by one and two additional years. That is, the outcome in the first 
falsification model was the difference between KCCT in the final and next-to-final years 
in which it was administered: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1)𝑖𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 − 𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑖−2)(𝑖−1).
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾  (5) 
The second falsification test was lagged one additional year: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑖−2)𝑖𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 − 𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑖−3)(𝑖−1).
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾  (6) 
Our motivation for including the second falsification test in equation (6) was concern that 
performance on the 2010 KCCT might have been anomalous because educators knew 
that it was the final year of that testing program.  
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Sensitivity Tests 
 As noted, the scaling of the KCCT resulted in appreciable censoring, with a 
substantial number of students scoring at the HOSS and a more modest number at the 
LOSS. Because we have no information about the actual distribution of performance of 
these students, we consider it most appropriate to remove them from our analyses. 
However, we also fitted models in which we included those students in order to clarify 
the effects of excluding them. These are presented in the Appendix. 
Results 
 We first present the simple student-level OLS results for both the KPREP and 
SAT-10 difference scores. We then discuss our principal findings based on two-level 
models, including the SAT-10 and falsification models. Because the difference scores are 
calculated by subtracting prior scores from recent scores, a negative sign indicates a 
decline in relative performance. 
Student-Level OLS Results 
 As expected, all eight of the OLS models (four grades by two tests) showed a 
decline in performance by poor students (Table 1). These declines were all significant but 
varied markedly in size, from 0.02 SD to 0.11 SD. Students with IEPs also declined in 
seven of eight models, in many cases by more, with effects up to 0.19 SD. Asian students, 
about whom we had no specified hypothesis, increased in all comparisons, in some cases 
by roughly 0.3 SD. The coefficients for Black students were inconsistent. 
Two-Level KPREP and SAT-10 Models 
 Many of our findings are consistent with our hypotheses, but there are a number 
of exceptions, particularly in grade 8. Most of the findings of our main KPREP analyses 
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were mirrored in our SAT-10 replication. We discuss grades 5 through 7 first and then 
turn to grade 8. Because the difference scores are calculated by subtracting prior scores 
from recent scores, a negative sign indicates a decline in relative performance. 
 Within schools, the relative performance of poor students in grades 5, 6, and 7 fell 
when the new KPREP was introduced. These decreases ranged from -0.06 to -0.09 
standard deviations, and all were highly significant (Table 2). Our SAT-10 replication 
yielded similar findings for these relationships (Table 3). These findings, however, do not 
represent the total association between poverty and the change in performance. Rather, 
they represent only the within-school relationship.  
 At the school level, an increase in the proportion of poor students predicted a 
decline in relative performance. In the case of KPREP, this effect ranged from -0.18 in 
grade 6 to -0.54 in grade 7 (Table 2). Again, we found similar results with our SAT-10 
replication (Table 3). Recall that because of the grand-mean centering, these are estimates 
of context effects. That is, even after controlling for the effects of the poverty status of 
individual students, an increase in the proportion of poor students predicted a decline in 
performance. 
 These school-level coefficients are substantial, but interpreting their magnitude 
requires additional calculation. The student-level and school-level coefficients are not 
directly comparable because they are not on the same scale. The student-level poverty 
coefficient is the adjusted mean difference between poor and non-poor students. In 
contrast, because the school poverty variable runs from 0 to 1.0, the school-level poverty 
coefficient is the estimated difference between schools with 0% and 100% poor students.  
To put the magnitude of the school-level coefficients into perspective, we can apply them 
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to the school-level distribution of the proportion poor. For example, we can compare the 
estimated change in performance for schools at the 25th and 75th percentiles on the 
distribution of proportion poor. In grade 7, where this coefficient was largest, the 
difference in the proportion poor for the schools at the 25th and 75th percentiles of this 
distribution was 0.24. Therefore, our KPREP model in this grade predicts that the school 
at the 75th percentile would be 0.13 student-level standard deviations (.24 × .54) lower in 
relative performance than the school at the 25th percentile, even after taking into account 
the student-level effect of poverty. 
 Relationships between change scores and both the Black/White dummy and the 
school proportion Black were inconsistent in sign and often non-significant. In all three 
grades, students with IEPs declined in relative performance on the KPREP, with 
coefficients ranging from -.03 to -.22 (Table 2). These declines were mirrored in the SAT-
10 (Table 3). We found no significant school-level relationships between the proportion 
of students with IEPs and changes in relative performance on either test.  
 While we had no explicit hypothesis about Asian students, we found a modest 
student-level increase in relative performance for Asian students in grades 5-7 on the 
KPREP, but only in grade 6 on the SAT-10. There were no school-level effects of 
proportion Asian in any instance. 
 The relationships with school’s mean gains were inconsistent. In grades 5 and 6, 
we found a modest negative relationship between mean gains on KCCT for the three 
prior years and relative performance on the KPREP, and these effects were significant at 
𝑝 < .001 (Table 2). Similar results were found for the SAT-10 (Table 3). However, no 
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relationships were found for either test in grade 7.1 Moreover, these findings failed the 
falsification test described below in several instances. That is, we found negative 
associations in some of the falsification models, when ideally we should not. This 
suggests that we should not have confidence in the estimates for this coefficient that we 
obtained in our main models. 
 The results in grade 8 were weaker, and this was again true with both the KPREP 
and the SAT-10. The negative student-level coefficient for poor students found in the 
other grades appeared in grade 8 as well, although the coefficient for poverty was very 
small (-0.03 with both tests; Tables 2 and 3). The grade-8 student-level coefficients for 
Asian and IEP students were roughly comparable to those in the other grades. However, 
the school-level coefficients for proportion poor were neither substantial nor significant 
in grade 8. 
Falsification tests 
 Our main models use a decline in relative performance with the introduction of 
the new KPREP and SAT-10 as an indication of greater score inflation. To test that the 
estimates of our main models stem from the changes in tests, we conducted falsification 
tests in which we replicated our main models with data lagged both one and two years, 
such that the outcome was the change between two successive implementations of the old 
KCCT test. The results of the falsification test can be seen in Tables 4 and 5. We expect 
that our results will fail to replicate in the falsification tests. 
                                                 
1 While we do not have a full explanation of the lack of effects in grade 7, we found that part of the 
difference between this grade and the other two appears to stem from multivariate outliers, specifically, a 
much larger range of Mahalnobis distances. Eliminating observations with large distances made the grade 7 
coefficient for the change variable somewhat more similar to those in the other grades. 
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 For the most part, the falsification models failed to replicate the findings from our 
main models. Unlike the estimates for the core two-level model we presented in Equation 
2, the student- level poor coefficients in the falsification models are near zero and 
generally not significant. In contrast, the estimates from the core model are universally 
negative, greater in magnitude, and highly significant (p<0.01). We found only two 
exceptions. First, the grade 7 student-level poor coefficient in the falsification model is 
negative and significant between 2010-11 and 2009-10 (p = 0.01). The grade 6 student-
level poor coefficient in the falsification model was also negative and significant in 2009-
2010 (p = 0.05). Even in these exceptional cases, however, the point estimates are still 
attenuated compared to the core two-level model. 
 In all grades except for grade 7, the school-level poor coefficients were also 
attenuated in the falsification models and sometimes reversed in sign (positive). For 
example, the point estimates were significant and positive in grade 6 (p = 0.01) and grade 
8 in 2009-10 (p = 0.05), indicating that poor students at times improved in rank when 
Kentucky administered the KCCT. As the exception, the grade 7 school-level poor 
estimate was negative and highly significant in 2010-11 (p < 0.01). Once again, however, 
the magnitude of this estimate is less than the estimate from the core model.  
Discussion 
 Our findings are largely consistent with the hypothesis that test-specific 
preparation for the previous KCCT high-stakes test was more intensive—or at least more 
effective—with disadvantaged students. As predicted, within schools, poor students fell 
in relative performance when the new high-stakes test was introduced. Similarly, students 
with IEPs fell in relative performance. These findings, and the finding that Asian students 
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increased in relative performance, are consistent with the notion that students who are at 
risk of scoring poorly receive more intensive test preparation. 
 In our view, the school-level relationship between the proportion of poor students 
and the change in relative performance is particularly important. Our models provided 
estimates of context or concentration effects: an increase in the proportion of poor 
students predicted a decline in relative performance above and beyond the effects of 
student-level poverty. While there is evidence that teachers can to some degree target test 
preparation to specific groups of students within their classes (e.g., Booher-Jennings, 
2005), it is reasonable to expect that much of the variation in test preparation lies between 
teachers and schools. Our findings are consistent with this expectation and support the 
suggestion by Koretz & Hamilton (2006) that it is important to examine aggregate 
relationships in evaluating score inflation (Koretz & Hamilton, 2006).  
 The SAT-10 replication and the falsification tests both substantially strengthen 
these conclusions. If systematic changes in relative performance were a result of the 
specific content sampling used to create the new high-stakes test, our primary results 
would not be replicated when using the SAT-10 as the outcome measure, but our findings 
were replicated consistently. Similarly, if our findings were a result of weaknesses of the 
data or the specifications employed, one would expect our findings to be replicated when 
we lagged our data by a single year, which removed the change in testing but left all else 
unaltered. However, our results were not replicated in the falsification tests.  
 Our data are not sufficient to explore the reasons for the far weaker findings in the 
grade 8 data. We found weaker findings in grade 8 using the SAT-10 as well, which rules 
out an anomaly in the construction of the eighth-grade KPREP as an explanation. It may 
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be that both of the new tests are similar enough to the eighth-grade KCCT that the 
difference scores do not capture useful variation. It is also plausible that preparation for 
the KCCT was distributed differently in the eighth grade than in the other grades, 
although we know of no other data to suggest this. Further explanation with additional 
data would be needed to explain these findings. 
 The modest sizes of some of our findings warrant discussion. Given our data, we 
can only speculate about this. There are also a number of reasons why our findings may 
underestimate these variations. First, as the present approach is novel, we do not know 
what fraction of score inflation can be captured by changes in high-stakes tests. We 
expect that this will vary depending on the context. New high-stakes tests are rarely 
introduced without preparation, and the more extensive the advance preparation, the less 
likely it is that this approach will capture a meaningful share of test preparation and 
inflation. For example, we replicated our models with data from New York State, which 
provided extensive preparation for the introduction of its Common Core tests in 2013, 
such as the launching of extensive web-based preparation two years before the 
introduction of the tests.2 Our KY findings did not replicate in the New York data. 
Second, no single audit measure is likely to capture fully the variations in test preparation 
activities and score inflation. Our data are not sufficient to evaluate these competing 
explanations. 
 Our findings have two broad implications, one substantive and the other 
methodological. First, this paper adds to the slowly growing literature indicating that test 
preparation and score inflation are in some cases more severe for disadvantaged students. 
                                                 
2  See www.engageny.org/. 
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This is of concern not only because of the negative implications about the quality of 
education provided to these students, but also because the result of this differential bias is 
an illusion of greater equity that can distort both policy and practice. Second, our findings 
suggest that the introduction of new material into high-stakes tests can serve as one 
method to help monitor for inappropriate test preparation and score inflation. 
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Figure 1. Distributions of KCCT and KPREP scores for calculation of the difference 
score for students in grade 6 in 2012, with the x-axis scale bounded by LOSS and HOSS. 




               



























































































































































































































N 46,821   46,240   44,943   44,452   44,767   44,321   44,946   44,405 
 
  



































































































































































































N 37,139   37,320   39,707   39,862 
Note. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
     
  





































































































































































































N 36,682   37,176   39,386   39,550 
Note. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
      
 
  



































































































































































































N 33,433   34,560   36,273   36,142 
Note. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
     
  



































































































































































































N 32,899   33,488   34,862   36,546 
Note. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Appendix 
Sensitivity Test: Including HOSS and LOSS 
 The sizable number of students who obtained the highest and lowest obtainable 
scores (HOSS/LOSS) on the KCCT (see Figure 1) indicates a substantial amount of 
censoring, particularly at the high end of the distribution. Because censoring is likely to 
artificially attenuate relationships between the outcome and predictors, we excluded 
students with censored scores.  To test the impact of this decision, we replicated our 
analyses with the students who had censored scores included. As expected, we found that 
including these students weakened our findings. Importantly, we found that the student-
level poor estimates were less negative (smaller in absolute value) when students who 
obtained the HOSS or LOSS were included. A comparison between estimates derived 
from the KPREP and NRT models including and excluding students at the HOSS or 
LOSS can be seen in Tables A1 and A2, respectively.  
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Table A1 
        
Regression results for 2012 KPREP minus 2011 KCCT analysis with students 
performing at the HOSS or LOSS included 
 Grade 4-5  Grade 5-6  Grade 6-7  Grade 7-8 
Student-Level Variables       
Poor -0.028***  -0.043***  -0.039***  -0.004 
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
IEP -0.032**  -0.124***  0.054***  -0.105*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Asian 0.222***  0.262***  0.148***  0.171*** 
 (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.030) 
Black 0.044***  0.053***  -0.007  0.074*** 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Hispanic 0.01  0.025  0.007  0.066*** 
 (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
School-Level Variables        
Proportion Poor -0.311***  -0.137  -0.536***  -0.019 
 (0.073)  (0.077)  (0.079)  (0.089) 
Proportion IEP -0.126  -0.189  -0.547*  -0.146 
 (0.210)  (0.207)  (0.240)  (0.269) 
Proportion Asian -0.136  0.432  -0.371  1.734* 
 (0.480)  (0.552)  (0.702)  (0.845) 
Proportion Black 0.033  -0.236*  0.442***  0.222 
 (0.094)  (0.093)  (0.120)  (0.133) 
Proportion Hispanic 0.4  -0.173  0.315  -0.041 
 (0.211)  (0.293)  (0.344)  (0.391) 
School Difference 07-10 -0.062***  -0.058***  -0.02  -0.026 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.014) 
Intercept -0.021  -0.008  -0.053***  -0.016 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
N 46,521   44,527  44,442  44,493 
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Table A2 
        
Regression results for 2012 NRT minus 2011 KCCT analysis with students performing at 
the HOSS or LOSS included 
 Grade 4-5  Grade 5-6  Grade 6-7  Grade 7-8 
Student-Level Variables       
Poor 0.000  -0.014  -0.030***  0.003 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
IEP -0.086***  -0.184***  -0.117***  -0.142*** 
 (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Asian 0.065*  0.163***  0.023  0.062* 
 (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Black -0.045***  0.066***  0.005  0.050*** 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Hispanic -0.046*  -0.026  -0.033  0 
 (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
School-Level Variables        
Proportion Poor -0.443***  -0.177*  -0.494***  -0.042 
 (0.065)  (0.071)  (0.077)  (0.071) 
Proportion IEP 0.012  -0.09  -0.386  -0.226 
 (0.187)  (0.191)  (0.235)  (0.219) 
Proportion Asian 0.083  0.335  -0.537  1.221 
 (0.423)  (0.506)  (0.684)  (0.666) 
Proportion Black 0.038  -0.196*  0.484***  0.309** 
 (0.084)  (0.086)  (0.117)  (0.105) 
Proportion Hispanic 0.451*  -0.033  0.471  -0.014 
 (0.187)  (0.220)  (0.336)  (0.309) 
School Difference 07-10 -0.081***  -0.056***  -0.016  -0.035** 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Intercept -0.024*  -0.013  -0.494***  -0.015 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.077)  (0.010) 
N 46,155  44,367  44,246  44,329 
Note. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001     
 
 
 
